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1. A central feature of EU governance 
Participation of interest representatives in EU decision-making procedures is a central 
feature of EU governance.2 At the outset of European integration, it was institutionalized 
via the advisory bodies that assisted the three original Communities (a Consultative 
Committee in the case of the European Coal and Steel Community; and the Economic 
and Social Committee, common to the European Economic Community and to the 
European Atomic Energy Community). The Court invoked the existence of the 
Economic and Social Committee as an argument to support the specificity of the then 
Community legal order in Van Gend en Loos. In its view, this was a means through which 
“nationals of the states brought together in the Community [were] called upon to 
cooperate in the functioning of [the] Community”.3 But participation developed mostly 
outside these bodies. In a neo-functionalist logic,4 participation was seen as a means to 
spur integration further, but also as a way of compensating the limited regulatory 
capacities of the EU policy-making institutions.5 Informal contacts with interest groups 
allowed an exchange of expertise but also anticipated consensus that could facilitate 
acceptance, implementation and, hence, effectiveness of the acts adopted.6 
The relations between the Commission and interest groups changed since the beginning 
of the 1990s, when transparency came to the fore both as an essential dimension of good 
administrative conduct and as a legal principle. Under the impetus of transparency, the 																																																								
1 As indicated in the footnotes below, this text is based on, and updates, some of the arguments that are 
developed in J. Mendes (2011), Participation in EU Rule-Making. A Rights-based Approach, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, Chapters 3 and 5. 
2 Participation has manifold meanings, but it can generally be defined as “decisional processes where 
persons ‘external’ to the institutional setup, different from those entrusted with decision-making powers, 
are formally [or informally] associated therewith” (Mendes, Participation in EU Rule-Making, cit., p. 27). 
3 Judgment in Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse administratie der belastingen, Case 26/62, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1, p. 
12 
4 See, e.g., E. Haas (1968 [1958]), The uniting of Europe. Political, social, and economic forces 1950-1957, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
5 In more detail, see Mendes, Participation in EU Rule-Making, cit., pp. 80-127. 
6 The opening statements of the Commission Communication “An open and structured dialogue between 
the Commission and special interest groups” are indicative of this dynamic: “The Commission has always 
been an institution open to outside input. The Commission believes this process to be fundamental to the 
development of its policies. This dialogue has proved valuable to both the Commission and to interested 
outside parties. Commission officials acknowledge the need for such outside input and welcome it.” 
(Communication 93/C63/02, of 12 of December 1992, SEC/92/2272 final). 
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Commission called for the self-regulation of interested groups, suggested codes of 
conduct, created a register of interest groups (now a joint Parliament and Commission 
Transparency Register), published minimum standards for consultation.7 These standards 
define the way the Commission relates to interest groups and the public during decision-
making procedures. They refer to the clarity and provision of information that grounds 
the consultation processes, to openness and effectiveness; they specify the time-frames 
for consultations and determine the publicity of the respective results.8 Together with the 
register, they remain the basis for the more structured way the Commission created to 
receive input from interest groups and the public via impact assessments.  
The Commission thus sought to change its image and its practices. In the past two 
decades, it turned participation into a “trust enhancing principle”, a principle that, 
despite the changes, remained mainly directed at ensuring the effectiveness of EU 
policies.9 In this turn, participation also became explicitly associated to the purpose of 
bringing the EU institutions closer to its citizens. It has also been widened, 
encompassing informal procedures whereby the public at large – and not only holders of 
concerned interests – is called upon to participate. The extent to which the 
Commission’s approach to participation – in particular its minimum standards – is 
followed by other institutions is uncertain. Nevertheless, the European Parliament has 
indicated that, subject to changes, the other EU institutions should also apply the 
standards the Commission defined for its services.10 
Importantly, the procedures leading to the adoption of non-legislative acts of general 
scope (rule-making) have escaped this reformation impetus in one significant aspect.11  																																																								
7  See, inter alia, Green Paper “European Transparency Initiative”, COM (2006) 194 final, Brussels, 
3.5.2006; Communication “European Transparency Initiative - A framework for relations with interest 
representatives (Register and Code of Conduct)” (COM(2008) 323 final, Brussels, 27.5.2008). These and 
other relevant documents are available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/info/homePage.do?locale=en. See also Communication from 
the Commission, “Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue - General principles and 
minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission”, COM(2002) 704 final, 
Brussels, 11.12.2002 (revised a decade later: Commission Staff Working Document, “Review of the 
Commission Consultation Policy”, SWD(2012) 422 final, Strasbourg, 12.12.2012). 
8 See Communication “Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue”, cit., pp. 19–22. 
9 K. Lenaerts (2004) ““In the Union we trust”: Trust-enhancing principles of Community law” Common 
Market Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 317–343. On the relevance of participation for the EU governance 
from the perspective of the Commission, see Commission, “European Governance. A White Paper”, 
COM (2001) 428 final, Brussels, 25.7.2001. 
10  EP Report on the perspectives for developing civil dialogue under the Treaty of Lisbon 
(2008/2067(INI)), Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Rapporteur: Genowefa Grabowska, 4.12.2008, 
pp. 8 and 9. 
11  Non-legislative rule-making can be defined as a “process of content definition of acts of general 
application that concretise policy or legislative options”; these acts “potentially entail the solution, or the 
criteria of the solution, of more specific (individual) cases” (D. Curtin, H. Hoffman, J. Mendes (2013), 
“Constitutionalising EU Executive Rule-Making Procedures:  A Research Agenda”, European Law Journal, 
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As will be seen in more detail below, the minimum standards of consultation were mainly 
intended to apply in the realm of impact assessments, hence in the phase that precedes 
the Commission’s proposal of legislative acts. Non-legislative rulemaking remains still 
today largely outside their scope.12  
There are no general formal legal provisions that would impose participation in 
rulemaking procedures. In EU law, participation in decision-making procedures beyond 
the scope protected by the principle of audi alteram partem – single-case decision-making – 
is always dependent on specific legislative provisions.13 No general principle of EU law 
dictates a legal requirement to ensure participation in rulemaking procedures, although 
this would be justified, from a rule of law perspective, in cases where general rules may 
have similar effects to individual decisions;14 and, more generally, by an imperative of 
democracy as currently enshrined in the EU Treaty.15 Specific legislative provisions – 
where existent – are usually very broad, open provisions that leave choices on who, on 
what, when to hear and how to treat participation results mostly to the discretion of the 
decision-maker.16  However, in some policy areas, the absence of formal legal rules has 
not prevented the creation of sophisticated consultation procedures established in 
internal documents of EU bodies. One of the most cited cases is that of the European 
Aviation Agency, whose founding regulation determines that the agency “consults widely 
with interested parties”.17  
The institutional interests and legal reasons defended by the EU institutions that have led 
to the exclusion of participation rights from rulemaking procedures and, indirectly, to the 
virtual exclusion of the role of law in regulating participation in rulemaking procedures 
will be explained next. 																																																																																																																																																														
Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 1-21, p. 2). 
12 See A. Alemanno and A. Meuwese (2013) “Impact Assessment of EU Non-Legislative Rulemaking: The 
Missing Link of 'New' Comitology”, European Law Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 76–92. 
13 P. Craig (2012), EU Administrative Law, Oxford: OUP, pp. 298-305.  
14 See the analysis and references in Mendes, Participation in EU Rule-Making, cit., Ch. 5. 
15 See, in this volume, Mendes, “Administrative procedure, administrative democracy”. 
16 E.g. The Commission “shall carry out appropriate consultations with stakeholders” (Article 10 (3)(c) of 
Directive 2010/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 on the indication 
by labelling and standard product information of the consumption of energy and other resources by 
energy-related products (OJ L 153/1, 18.6.2010). 
17 EASA Management Board Decision 01-2012 [procedure to be applied by the agency for the issuing of 
opinions, certification specifications and guidance material] (available at 
http://easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/EASA%20MB%20Decision%2001-
2012%20Revised%20MB%20Decision%20RM%20Process%20.pdf). See Article 52 of Regulation (EC) 
No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 on common rules in 
the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Council 
Directive 91/670/EEC, Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 and Directive 2004/36/EC (OJ L 79, 19.3.2008), 
which determines that consultation should follow “a timetable and a procedure which includes an 
obligation on the Agency to make a written response to the consultation process” (para 1) c)). 
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2. Denying the role of law 
2.1. The Court: Atlanta  
The leading case on this matter remains Atlanta.18 The applicants claimed that their legal 
situation was affected by force of a Council regulation, adopted on the basis of the 
Treaty, concerning the bananas market and argued that they should have been heard 
before its adoption. The then Court of First Instance – upheld on appeal by the 
European Court of Justice – dismissed this plea on the basis of three main arguments. 
First, the right to be heard “must be considered in its proper context” and should not be 
extended to legislative procedures leading to the adoption of acts involving a choice of 
economic policy applicable to the generality of the traders concerned.19 Secondly, the 
only obligations of consultation incumbent on the Union legislature are those laid down 
in the Treaty. Thirdly, “the obligation to consult the Parliament, as laid down in various 
places in the Treaty, reflects at the [Union] level the fundamental democratic principle 
that the people should take part in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a 
representative assembly”. 20  Subsequent case law confirmed and extended these 
arguments to non-legislative rulemaking adopted on the basis of EU legislation. 21 
Nevertheless, in this instance these arguments were particularly weak.22 If at all, respect 
for the procedures defined in the Treaty was only capable of excluding participation rights in 
the adoption of legal acts directly based on the Treaty. Even here the scope of the principle 
of representative democracy was quite limited – in the case at hand, the Council had 
adopted the regulation challenged in Atlanta after mere consultation of the Parliament. 
But to deny participation rights in the adoption of non-legislative acts on the basis of the 
principle according to which the exercise of power should be exercised at the EU level 
through the intermediary of a representative assembly was decidedly misplaced, given 
that, then, the role of the Parliament was considerably weak, where not inexistent.23 In 																																																								
18  Judgment of 11 December 1996, Atlanta and others v Council and Commission, T-521/93, 
ECLI:EU:T:1996:184, para 70 to 74; Judgment in Atlanta and others v Commission and Council, Case C-104/97 
P, ECLI:EU:C:1999:498, para 35 to 38.  
19 Idem, para 70; idem, para 37. 
20  Judgment in Atlanta, ECLI:EU:T:1996:184, para 71. On this argument, see also, Case T-135/96, 
UEAPME v Council, [1998] ECR II-2335, para 88. 
21 Judgment of 16 July 1988, Laboratoires pharmaceutiques Bergaderm SA and Jean-Jacques Goupil v Commission, 
Case T-199/96, ECLI:EU:T:1998:176; Judgment of 11 September 2002, Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council, 
Case T-13/99, ECLI:EU:T:2002:209, and Judgment of 11 September 2002, Alpharma Inc. v Council, Case T-
70/99, ECLI:EU:T:2002:210. 
22 For a developed analysis and criticism of Atlanta, see Mendes, Participation in EU rule-making, Chapter 5. 
23 Consider the role of the Parliament in comitology procedures during the 1990s and early 2000s.  
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general, the Court’s strong assertion regarding people’s participation in the “exercise of 
power” – implicitly accepted by the Court of Justice on appeal – denied that participatory 
democracy could be complementary to representative democracy. Today, this position is 
incompatible with the provisions of the Treaty on democracy.24  
The reasons why the Courts have refrained from imposing participation rights in 
rulemaking relate also to their construction of the right to be heard in procedures leading 
to the adoption of individual decisions.25 The recognition of a right to be heard depends 
on the production of an adverse effect in the legal sphere of a sufficiently individualised 
person.26 In the Courts’ view, which corresponds to the traditional way of conceiving the 
right to be heard, this requires that the act at issue establish a bilateral relationship 
between the decision-maker and the person affected. This means that the act needs to be 
an individual decision (or an act that can be considered as such) and that the holder of 
the right to be heard is, formally or substantively, its addressee. Participation rights could, 
therefore, not be transposed to the realm of rulemaking. This conception is mainly, but 
not exclusively, due to the influence of trial type judicial procedures in shaping 
procedural guarantees in administrative procedures.27  
Other reasons may be invoked to explain the Courts’ stance. One is a simplified view of 
the complexity of EU legal acts, according to which normative acts of general application 
and acts addressed at an identified addressee or addressees correspond to two neatly 
separated categories. The Courts have not ignored the fact that the former can be of 
individual concern to sufficiently individualised persons, but they have inconsistently 
valued the relevance attributed to this fact for purposes of granting participation rights.28 
In addition, the Courts’ approach to participation rights in rulemaking procedures has 
been conditioned by the restrictive standing rules enshrined in former Article 230 (4) EC, 
which Article 263(4) TFEU loosened with regard to non-legislative acts that do not 
require implementing measures. 29  The requirement of individual concern has been 
																																																								
24 See, in this volume, Mendes, “Administrative procedure, administrative democracy”. 
25 In this sub-section, “Courts” is used in the plural to refer to the General Court and the European Court 
of Justice. Their arguments on the right to be heard were mutually reinforced in the both judgments issued 
in the case of Atlanta. 
26 E.g., Judgment in Transocean Marine Paint Association v Commission, Case 17/74, ECLI:EU:C:1974:106, para 
15.  
27 See, for more detail, Mendes, Participation in EU rule-making, cit., Chapter 4. 
28  See, further, Mendes, Participation in EU rule-making, cit., Chapter 5, Section 5.2. 
29 Order of 6 September 2011, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Parliament and Council, Case T-
18/10, ECLI:EU:T:2011:419, para 56, establishing that “regulatory” acts, in the sense of Article 263(4) 
exclude legislative act (upheld on appeal Judgment in Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Parliament 
and Council, Case C-583/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:625, para 56 to 61). See also Judgment of 25 October 
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influential at three different levels. To begin with, it has been transposed to define access 
also to administrative procedures: participation rights have been denied when individual 
concern to access the procedure cannot be established.30 Next, the Courts have arguably 
feared the effects of the interplay between access to administrative procedures and 
standing: accepting broader rules of participation would strain their restrictive approach 
to standing. Finally, the restrictive standing rules have prevented the Court from being 
faced more often with pleas to extend participation rights: those actions that could be 
brought by persons whose rights and legally protected interests are affected by EU 
general acts, but who, nevertheless, did not have a direct and individual interest to 
require the annulment of an act, were most times considered inadmissible. Since the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, however, natural and legal persons do not need to 
demonstrate individual concern to grant standing in one specific set of cases, i.e. legal 
challenges to “regulatory acts” that do “not entail implementing measures”.31 This may 
allow more challenges grounded on breach of participation rights in procedures leading 
to this type of acts. It also opens the way to broaden access to administrative procedures: 
should the Courts continue using the conditions of standing as equally determinative of 
access to administrative procedures, at least in one instance “individual concern” will not 
be required. 
The Courts’ stance is perplexing in the cases where there is an analogy with the situations 
covered by the right to be heard. Normative acts of general application may have a legal 
impact similar to individual decisions in the legal sphere of individuals. In particular in 
such cases, the Courts’ denial of participation rights eschews enforcing the rule of law in 
one of its fundamental dimensions: the protection of legally protected interests affected 
by the unilateral intervention of public powers. Recently, the Court has indirectly 
admitted the analogy between the effects of individual decisions and those of acts of 
general application, but has done so in one case delimited by two specific circumstances. 
First, the act challenged was a decision that had no formal addressees, but that was of 
direct and individual concern to the applicant because the procedure had been initiated 
by the latter.32 Secondly, the Regulation that based the adoption of the contested decision 
entailed, at various stages, the applicant’s right to submit comments. Nevertheless, the 
decision at stake - a Commission Implementing Decision that refused to include in a list 																																																																																																																																																														
2011, Microban v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2011:623, para 21 to 39, for a clarification of the requirements of 
standing regarding regulatory acts that do not require implementing measures. 
30 Pfizer, cit., para 487 and Alpharma, cit., para 388. 
31 See footnote 29. 
32 Judgment of 6 September 2013, Sepro Europe Ltd v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2013:407, para 30 and 31. 
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of authorised products a chemical substance - arguably produced general effects, since 
non-inclusion means that the substance cannot be marketed by whoever would wish to 
do so. Among other pleas, the applicant alleged breach of the right to be heard. The 
Court recognised that “the contested decision adversely [affected] the applicant”, after 
having recalled its most restrictive formulation of the right to be heard – i.e. it is a 
corollary of the rights of the defence that ought to be observed “in an administrative 
procedure taken against a specific person” or “initiated against a person which are liable to 
culminate in a measure adversely affecting that person”.33 The Court did not explicitly say 
that the applicant had a right to be heard. But the act’s adverse effect sufficed to examine 
the applicant’s arguments. 34  However, the two specific circumstances of the case 
mentioned, indicate that this line of reasoning is unlikely to be extended to other cases. 
The applicant was affected in such a way that the Court did not consider it necessary to 
examine whether the decision at stake was a regulatory act that does not entail 
implementing measures. The analogy with individual decisions with formal addressees 
was quite straightforward. The step has not been made to a situation in which, in view of 
the direct impact that EU rulemaking may have in the legal sphere of private persons, 
these persons should be recognised a right to participate even in the absence of 
procedural rules establishing that right.35  
2.2. The Commission  
The reason behind the Commission’s choice to develop participation at the margins of 
law is fairly straightforward: it boils down to avoiding the risk of excessive legalism that 
could hinder the timely delivery of policy, as was explicitly stated in the 2002 
Communication defining the minimum standards of consultation. In the words of the 
Commission: “a situation must be avoided in which a Commission proposal could be 
challenged in the Court on the grounds of alleged lack of consultation of interested 
parties. Such an over-legalistic approach would be incompatible with the need for timely 
delivery of policy, and with the expectations of the citizens that the European 
Institutions should deliver on substance rather than concentrating on procedures.”36 
																																																								
33 Idem, para 65 to 67, emphasis added. 
34 See, further, on the distinction between “initiated against” and “adversely affecting”, Mendes, 
Participation in EU rule-making, cit., Chapter 4, and I. Rabinovici (2012)  “The Right to Be Heard in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union”, European Public Law, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 149–173. 
35 See, in more detail, Mendes, Participation in EU rule-making, cit., Chapter 5, Section 5.3 and Chapter 2. 
36  “Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue”, cit., p. 10; see also Commission, 
“European Governance. A White Paper”, COM(2001) 428 final, Brussels, 25.7.2001, pp. 16-17.  
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As mentioned above, the Commission excluded from the scope of application of the 
principles and standards of consultation defined in this Communication non-legislative 
initiatives not covered by impact assessment procedures.37 In 2009, it extended impact 
assessment procedures to “certain implementing measures … likely to have significant 
impacts”.38  In these cases, consultations are subject to the 2002 standards. This still 
excludes the application of consultation standards from most non-legislative rule-making, 
including from most delegated and implementing acts.39 The selection of those cases is 
mostly in the hands of the Commission, as there are very few legislative acts that make 
the adoption of non-legislative acts of general application subject to impact assessment 
procedures. The European Court of Auditors has been critical of the lack of 
transparency of the Commission’s selection of initiatives that it subjects to impact 
assessments. 40  But even, where the Commission’s standards apply – seemingly 
constraining the choices on how to conduct consultation – its services fail often to 
comply. According to the Impact Assessment Board, consultation has been one of the 
“recurring” “basic weaknesses” of impact assessment reports.41 The problem resides in 
the lack of or inadequate feedback these reports give to participants: their views – “in 
particular (…) those unlikely to be acted upon”42 – are not transparently reflected in the 
IA reports. 
At any rate, the full discretion of the Commission in making basic choices regarding the 
opportunity and forms of participation excludes any possibility of these procedures 
functioning as a surrogate means of procedural protection of the legal sphere of persons 
																																																								
37 Communication “Towards a reinforced culture of consultation…”, cit., p. 15.  
38  Commission, ‘Impact Assessment Guidelines’, 15 Jan. 2009, SEC(2009) 92, p. 6 (available at < 
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/commission_guidelines/docs/iag_2009_en.pdf>), emphasis 
added. 
39 Post-Lisbon, the reference to “implementing measures” in the 2009 Guidelines should be read to include 
delegated acts. See Curtin, Hofmann and Mendes, “Constitutionalising EU Executive Rule-Making 
Procedures”, cit., p. 12, fn 52. 
40 See European Court of Auditors, “Impact Assessments in the EU institutions: do they support decision 
making?”, Special Report No. 3/2010, pp. 28 and 46. 
41  “Impact Assessment Board Report for 2012” (available at http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/impact/key_docs/docs/iab_report_2012_en_final.pdf), p. 24. The IA Report of 2013 noted 
that “The number of recommendations relating to stakeholder consultation continued to be important (…) 
However, this did not reflect an increased concern with regard to the respect of the Commission's 
consultation standards, but rather with the way in which stakeholders' views were presented in draft IA 
reports” (p. 7; see footnote below).  
42 IA Board Report 2011, p. 16; IA Board Report 2012, pp. 16, 24-6; IA Board Report 2013, pp. 7 and 8 
(which indicates that “The Board's opinions often recommended to present the different views throughout 
the report, to be transparent about critical views and to better explain how stakeholders' concerns were 
taken into account”). 
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affected by rulemaking.43 As explained above, the Courts have indirectly sanctioned the 
Commission’s choices by denying participation rights in rulemaking procedures in the 
absence of a legal provision. The task to change the status quo has thus been placed 
squarely in the hands of the EU legislator.  
2.3. The EU legislator 
The EU legislator has not been active in fostering participation rights in rulemaking 
procedures of EU institutions and executive bodies. This may be partially explained by 
the fact that the Commission is the legislative initiator par excellence and it is not 
inclined to give away its free choice in deciding who, when and how to consult. The 
persistent influence of the model of executive federalism in shaping the image of the EU 
administration may be an additional reason. This image is still likely to condition 
legislative decisions on the design of procedures, which, moreover, may be trapped in the 
delicate balance that needs to be achieved between competing interests in negotiating EU 
legislation. In general, however, in contrast with its position regarding the decisional 
procedures followed by the EU institutions, the EU legislator has imposed participation 
procedures on the Member States when implementing EU law,44 as well as on European 
standardisation organisations to whom the Commission requests the elaboration of 
standards.45 
More evidently, the European Parliament has recently denied (or overlooked?) the 
possibility of participation procedures being included in a possible future law on the EU 
administrative procedure. By a resolution of 2013, the European Parliament requested 
the Commission to make a legislative proposal in this regard. Its recommendations were, 
in substance, limited to codifying general principles and procedural rules applicable to 
individual decision-making that have long been established in the case law and have been 
restated in the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour of the European Ombudsman. 46 
																																																								
43 Mendes, Participation in EU rule-making, cit., pp. 132-136. On the effectiveness of these mechanisms, see 
Craig, EU Administrative Law, cit., p. 301. 
44 Craig, EU Administrative Law, cit., 298–299. 
45  Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
25 October 2012 on European standardisation (OJ L 316, 14.11.2012, p. 12–33). 
46 European Parliament resolution of 15 January 2013 with recommendations to the Commission on a Law 
of Administrative Procedure of the European Union (2012/2024(INI)), Annex, recommendations 3 and 4. 
The other recommendations pertain to the objective and scope of the regulation to be adopted 
(Recommendation 1), to the relationship between the regulation and sectoral instruments 
(Recommendation 2), to the review and correction of own decisions (Recommendation 5), to the form and 
publicity to be given to the regulation (Recommendation 6). The Code is available at 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/resources/code.faces#/page/1. The legislative proposal requested 
would not turn the Ombudsman’s Code binding. 
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There was no word regarding procedural rules that could guide the making of non-
legislative acts, much less on participation. Two reasons may explain – albeit not justify – 
this silence regarding non-legislative acts. 47  First, the fact that national laws on the 
administrative procedure largely lack rules on lawmaking by administrations may have 
influenced the choice of the Parliament. The eventual coherence of a possible EU law on 
the administrative procedure with its national counter-parts could facilitate the Council’s 
support to the Parliament’s proposal. At the same time, the absence of rules on 
administrative lawmaking in most national laws on the administrative procedure makes 
them obsolete, rather than commendable. 48  From the perspective of procedural 
protection, the sheer significance of the use of general rules by contemporary 
administrations impoverishes a law on the administrative procedure that focuses only on 
individual decision-making. 49  Second, a minimum version of a EU law on the 
administrative procedure could also increase the chances that the Commission would 
follow Parliament’s resolution and advance a legislative proposal. 50  However, the 
minimum version requested by the Parliament will have missed a crucial share of what 
the Union administration does. 
 
3. Towards hardening participation in EU rulemaking 
Concretising the rule of law and democracy – both fundamental values of EU law – in 
non-legislative rulemaking procedures requires forms of participation that go beyond a 
purely policy driven approach that focuses on process efficiency and outputs without 
																																																								
47  Also in J. Mendes, “The making of delegated and implementing acts: legitimacy beyond inter-
institutional balances” in C.F. Bergstrom and D. Ritleng (eds.) Comitology and Commission Rule-making after 
Lisbon: The New Chapter, forthcoming (OUP). 
48 J. Barnes “Reforma e innovación del procedimiento” in J. Barnes (ed.) La Transformación del Procedimento 
Adminsitrativo, Sevilla: Global Law Press – Editorial Derecho Global, pp. 11-69, at pp. 19-23. 
49 J. Mashaw (1981), “Administrative due process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory”, 61 Boston University 
Law Review, pp. 889-91, p. 896. 
50 Under Article 225 TFEU the Commission is not bound to follow the Parliament’s request. As the 
European Parliament stressed recently, although the Commission usually complies with the formal 
requirement to reply to Parliament’s requests, it fails on “substantial follow-up”. The problem seems to be 
serious enough, given that the Parliament has invoked the need for a Treaty revision that would force the 
Commission to follow up on its proposals, thereby directly challenging the Commission’s formal exclusive 
power of initiating legislation that has been at the core of the Union method since the outset of the 
Communities (see Report on the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon with respect to the European 
Parliament (2013/2130(INI)), A70120/2014, 17.2.2014, Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Rapporteur: 
Paulo Rangel, para 28 and 29). In this case, the Commission purported to follow the Parliament’s 
recommendation (see “Follow up to the European Parliament resolution with recommendations to the 
Commission on a Law of Administrative Procedure of the European Union, adopted by the Commission 




consideration for procedural protection or equality. 51 This might – and in many cases will 
– require legal rules on participation that ensure sufficient conditions of access and voice. 
From the perspective of the rule of law, some degree of limitation of the discretion of 
the decision-maker as to who, when, and how consult is needed in the cases where the 
procedural protection to holders of legally protected interests affected by rulemaking 
should be granted. That would be particularly justified where non-legislative acts of 
general application produce similar effects in the individual’s legal spheres as individual 
decisions. The fact that Article 41 of the Charter, when mentioning the rights of the 
citizens vis-à-vis the EU administration, only refers to single case decision-making is not 
an obstacle to enshrining procedural rules on participation in rule-making. These would 
be outside the scope of a fundamental right to good administration. 
There are of course costs to the establishment of binding procedural rules on 
participation. Participation is bound to consume significant resources and to delay 
procedures. Depending on the rules of standing (still restrictive in EU law regarding acts 
of general application) binding rules will extend the power of the Courts to procedures 
that would otherwise be a matter of purely administrative practice. More powerful legal 
persons are likely to take advantage and manipulate procedural rules in their benefit. All 
these are important considerations that need to be seriously considered in designing 
procedural rules. There may not be easy solutions, but there are alternatives to an 
outright denial of binding legal rules and procedural rights that compromises 
fundamental legal and political values of the Union.52 More than a decade of practice of a 
non-legal approach to participation in rulemaking procedures – tenaciously defended by 
the Commission – has shown its limits. The Commission’s minimum standards of 
consultation, despite having led to improvements in terms of transparency and 




51 On the rationale of democracy supporting procedural rules of participation, and how that rationale may 
partially overlap with a rule of law rationale see, in this volume, Mendes, “Administrative procedure, 
administrative democracy”. 
52 See, e.g., Mendes, Participation in EU rule-making, cit., Chapter 5, Section 5.3 and Chapter 2, Section 2.6. 
